The Measures on Aid and Management for Urban Vagrants and Beggars, issued by the State Council in mid-July, took effect on August 1. It marks a further improvement of China’s mechanism to aid urban vagrants and beggars. The new regulation has been enacted to replace the two-decade-old Measures for the Internment and Deportation of Urban Vagrants and Beggars. This policy reform has stemmed from the astounding case of Sun Zhigang, a young man that was brutally beaten to death while in custody at the Guangzhou Detention Center.
　　　　　
Sun Zhigang, leading character of a tragedy that shocked the nation.

From June 5 to 6, 2003, the Sun Zhigang case was brought to trial in the Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court. A total of 12 people guilty of beating Sun to death received death penalties or terms of imprisonment ranging from three years to life from Guangzhou Municipal Intermediate People’s Court on June 9. Another six civil servants in Guangzhou were also sentenced to two to three years in prison by Tianhe and Baiyun district courts in Guangzhou respectively, for their malpractice that was partly to blame for the tragedy.

By then, the incident that had shocked the central government and drew great concerns from the whole nation finally came to an end. While it moved on, more people focused their attention to the holding system that is closely related to the rights and interests of millions of people who migrate around different cities.

According to the statistics of the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs, in the past two years, there have been over one million people deported annually from the 700 and more detention centers around the country back to their native hometowns. South China’s Guangdong Province ranks first in detaining several hundred thousand of people every year, followed by Beijing and Shanghai. Deaths and injuries caused by detention sometimes occur at some places.

So the death of Sun Zhigang stirred more and more people to ask the same question: How could a man like Sun Zhigang, who should by no means have been detained, get killed in detention? What has been wrong with the internment and deportation policies formulated in 1982? Whither is reform of China’s holding system?

A citizen’s abnormal death

At 10 pm of March 17, 2003, Sun Zhigang, who was fond of surfing on the Internet, left the house he rented with a friend and was going to a net bar in the neighborhood. At Huangcun Street in Tianhe District, he was suddenly stopped by a local police. As Sun did not carry any identification card, he was brought to the police station. The 27-year-old Sun had worked in a company in Shenzhen upon graduation from Central China’s Wuhan Polytechnic College in 2001 and had just moved to Guangzhou about twenty days before, as a designer employed by the city’s Daqi Garment Company. New to Guangzhou, Sun had not yet applied for a temporary residency certificate.

At about 11 pm, Sun’s friend, Shu, received a phone call, in which Sun told him that he had been detained at the Huangcun Street Police Station for not having the temporary residency certificate and asked Shu to take his ID card and some money to bail him out. Shu and a colleague named Yang immediately rushed to that police station.
　　　　　
The place where Sun Zhigang was detained before death.

It was nearly midnight when Shu and Yang got there. Yet they were told that even with his ID card, “Sun Zhigang could not be bailed.” They found two police officers for the bail, but both turned them down, saying “it is impossible to have this man discharged” but giving no reason. One of the officers also asked them to check relevant regulations, claiming that the police are authorized to detain people.

Shu later saw Sun through the window of an office and stealthily asked him how he got caught and if he was “incooperative.” Sun replied that he didn’t do anything wrong but was simply caught soon after he came out. He had retorted to the police, but he hardly said a harsh word.

At that the police came and demanded that Sun write down a report. That was the last Shu saw him.

At 2 am of March 18, Sun was sent to the detention center attached to Tianhe Branch of Public Security as a vagrant without legal ID card, proper residency and livelihood.

On March 19, Sun’s friends called that detention center, and learned that Sun had been sent to the hospital (a center in aid of detainees in Guangzhou). The hospital’s registration record that Sun was admitted at 11:30 pm of March 18.

Sun’s friends called again to inquire for his whereabouts at noon of March 20, when they received the unbelievable reply that Sun had died of heart attack.

The record of Sun’s medical care noted that when admitted into the hospital, Sun Zhigang “showed symptoms of insomnia, palpitation, frequent micturition, and nausea,” yet he “remained conscious and appeared quiet.” Throughout his hospitalization, he was almost always “asleep.” At 10 am on March 20, the nurses found that his condition “deteriorated rapidly, as he looked pale, wordless and motionless, breathing weakly, and his blood pressure could hardly be measured.” At 10:15 am, doctors gave him some injection of adrenaline. Ten minutes later, all treatments were stopped. Thus the end of Sun’s twenty-seven-year life.

Sun’s friends were told to wait at the funeral parlor. Two hours later, the cadaver arrived.

Sun’s medical care record noted that he died at 10:25 am of March 20, 2003. The hospital insisted that he died a sudden death from heart attack.

Sun’s father rushed to Guangzhou at the news of his sudden death. The heart-broken father could by no means believe that his son had died of heart attack, as Sun Zhigang never mentioned that he had any heart trouble. Sun’s family began to seek truth up and down, but to no avail. “We just wanted to know how he died,” says Sun Zhigang’s younger brother. “Some people in the public security authorities and procuratorates said they didn’t know. Some just asked us to go here and there, to the court and to the procuratorate. Yet people in the procuratorate said it was beyond their capacity and they only dealt with units rather than individuals. The court said they would accept no complaint but plaints.” Then they went to the local bureau of civil affairs. Although one guy in the bureau came down and took the materials they handed over, they were told to go to the local health bureau since Sun died in a hospital. The local health bureau rejected their materials but told them to go to a medical society for the investigation of the hospital. There they were told that a forensic medical examination must be conducted first.

Day after day, night after night, still there was nobody telling them how Sun Zhigang had died and who should be responsible for his death.

Media disclosure
　　　　　
The public expect that the police perform their duties according to the law.

On April 25, a newspaper called Southern City published an article titled “Who should be responsible for a citizen’s abnormal death”, which raised doubts about the death of Sun Zhigang. This immediately caused a public outcry, and the case became a most sensational event irrelevant to SARS during the SARS epidemic.

On April 26, Beijing Youth Daily, an influential newspaper in Beijing, carried a detailed report about that Sun Zhigang died at a detention center and his family tried to find out the cause in vain. The report also raised questions about the cause of his death.

According to the Guangzhou hospital, Sun Zhigang had “died a sudden death of heart attack.” But the forensic autopsy report ran counter to this diagnosis. The autopsy report issued by the Forensic Medical Center of Zhongshan Medical School of the Zhongshan University on April 18 made it clear: “A comprehensive analysis led to the conclusion that Sun Zhigang’s case was in conformity with the death caused by traumatic shock due to massive parenchyma damages.”

The legal medical experts discovered a 3.5cm-deep haemorrhage in Sun’s subcutaneous tissue, in an area of 60 by 50 cm. As Sun was a square-shouldered young man of 1.74m tall, such a large area of haemorrhage means almost his entire back was covered with blood.

According to the legal medical experts, the haemorrhage should be the outcome of striking with something blunt several times, “as one striking could not produce such a large area of haemorrhage,” says a legal medical expert after reading the autopsy report. The report, he says, points to an indisputable fact that Sun had been beaten a few days before he died, and the beating eventually caused his death.

The case exposed by news media incurred flooding of editorials in various press and netizens’ comments on the Internet, expressing both indignation at the abuse of power and sympathy with Sun. Many strongly demanded a severe punishment to the killers. A netizen from Guangzhou said: “I feel so sorry that a college graduate who just stepped into society was killed like that, not by gangsters but by people of law enforcing organs, only because he failed to have a temporary residency certificate.” Another netizen said: “There have been so many incredible cases of law-violations involving policemen. These cases and Sun Zhigang’s death all point to one serious issue, that is, the law enforcers stand aloof any supervision and restraints by law, and there is no mechanism to rigidly hold the law-violators among them accountable... So these people could offend law at will, fearless about the outcomes. They are no longer the law enforcers, but are trampling on the law, and trampling on the citizens’ basic rights to life.”

Higher leadership alerted

The media exposure of Sun Zhigang’s case alerted the leaders from both the central government and the provincial government of Guangdong. Luo Gan, member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee’s Political Bureau and Secretary of the Committee of Political Science and Law under the CPC Central Committee, and Zhou Yongkang, member of the CPC Central Committee’s Political Bureau and Ministery of Public Security, instructed on several occasions that a thorough investigation of the case must be conducted. Zhang Dejiang, Political Bureau member and Party Secretary of Guangdong, also demanded that the killers must be severely punished according to law so as to safeguard the dignity of law and the legal rights of the people, and uphold justice for Sun Zhigang and his family.

The Ministry of Public Security dispatched a special working group to Guangdong to supervise the investigation on the case. A joint investigation team was formed by departments in charge of law enforcement, civil affairs, Party disciplinary inspection and health from the provincial government of Guangdong and the municipal government of Guangzhou. Eight groups of police officers were sent to Henan, Shaanxi, Hunan, Sichuan, Shanxi, Guizhou and other provinces to chase after the suspects. By May 12, all the eighteen suspects invovled in the case were arrested.

On May 20, a public prosecution was put on by the procuratorate. On June 6, the eighteen defendants were brought to trial in three courts simultaneously.

What is noteworthy is that on June 4, the day before the trial, the municipal government of Guangzhou announced that 23 government officials, including senior police, health and civil affairs leaders, were sacked or censured for their accountability in the case. On that same day, a sum of state compensation was sent to bank account of Sun’s family. Although neither the punishment nor the compensation could completely offset the abnormal death of a citizen and the grief of his family, they did show the social justice and fairness of the law. The court trial lay bare the cause of Sun’s death, which was detailed in the indictment of Guangzhou procuratorate: At around 10 pm of March 18, 2003, Sun Zhigang was sent to Room 201 of the Jiangcun Inpatient Department (center in aid of detainees) attached to the Guangzhou Mental Hospital. On the evening of March 19, Sun screamed for help to relatives of other detainees and thus incurred anger from an attendant working at the center named Qiao Yanqin. Qiao consulted another attendant named Qiao Zhijun and decided to transfer Sun to Room 206 for detainees there to beat him.

When Sun was moved to Room 206 after midnight, Qiao Yanqin and Lu Erpeng, another attendant, respectively inspired Li Haiying and other inmates to beat him. At about 1:00 am of March 19, the detainees in Room 206 began the beating. Urged by Qiao Yanqin, the detainees continued beating Sun Zhigang, disregarding his pleading for mercy. Later, Sun was moved to Room 205. When Sun informed Lu Erpeng of the beating, Lu stabbed him with his plastic stick at the chest and the belly. At about 10:00 am that day, Sun Zhigang died.

Now the real cause of Sun Zhigang’s death was known to the public and all the 18 criminals got their due punishment by law.

Question on Sun’s detention

In Sun Zhigang’s case people found another question. Sun did not seem to be a target for detention in accordance with relative regulations. But why was he detained?
　　　　　
The Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court where the Sun Zhigang case was tried.

The Provincial Regulations on the Management of Collection and Repatriation of Guangdong, adopted by the Standing Committee of the Provincial People’s Congress on February 23, 2002, stipulates that “the regulations apply to the management work to collect and repatriate urban vagrants, beggars and other homeless people without proper livelihood in this province.”

When suggesting that Sun Zhigang be detained, an investigator of the Huangcun Street Police Station had these words to write down: “According to Clause 6, Article 9 of the Provincial Regulations on the Management of Collection and Repatriation of Guangdong, it is proposed that he should be collected.” This clause reads: “Anyone without a legal identification paper, a normal residence and proper source of income who tramps in the street shall be subject to collection.”

The regulations also stipulate that “a person who has legal identification paper, normal residence, proper source of income but fails to carry the legal identification paper with him shall not to be detained if he articulate the situation and his explanation is confirmed.” Sun Zhigang had an employer, who confirmed his legal source of income; he lived at the house he rented with a friend, which confirmed his normal residence; and he had an ID card, which confirmed his legal identity. The interrogation record at the police station clearly noted down the number of Sun’s ID card. But in the form filled in by the Huangcun Street Police Station, he became “a man without a legal identification paper, a normal residence and proper source of income.”

How did Sun Zhigang become a man “without proper source of income” in the interrogation record he personally signed? As a college graduate, his IQ could not be so low as to deny he had a job.

By all means, following the interrogation record, Sun became a vagrant without anything right. The chief of the police station signed his agreement to “detain and deport” him, and the superior public security authorities agreed to “hold him for examination.” Hence Sun Zhigang’s detention.
　　　　　
Sun Zhigang's younger brother helps the grief-ridden father out of the court after the first trial.

What was the real reason for his detention? Sun’s friends hold that he was detained because he retorted to the police. But a netizen from the same district where the case took place gave another explanation: “Why did they insist on checking Sun’s temporary residency certificate? Because he could be fined if he did not have one! This is known to everyone who has lived in Huangcun. Why did that police station ignore so many issues they were expected to intervene? It is hard not to think of illicit benefits involved.” He maintained that was the real “utmost culprit” that murdered Sun Zhigang.

Another cause for the detention of people like Sun Zhigang who should not be collected according to the regulations, as some experts point out, is the misconception of how to keep the social order. Some departments suppose that the detention of more people is the only solution to the problem of social order. In implementing laws and regulations, some law-enforcement authorities intentionally or unintentionally expanded their power, which led to unfair treatment to the migrant people.

There had been nothing wrong to expect to keep a city in order by means of checking temporary residency certificates and detention. However, both practices involved considerable gains from collecting fees for issuing certificates, imposing penalties and releasing detainees. Consequently, in the high-sounding excuse of maintaining social security, some police tend to abuse their power to illegally restrain people’s personal freedom.

Holding system faulted

When China first adopted the system of holding and repatriating in 1951, it mainly aimed at the disbanded soldiers of the defeated KMT troops, prostitutes and unemployed tramps. By means of collecting them the government assembled them and helped transform them into labor forces and get them employed.

The first large-scaled detention and repatriation took place in 1954, when many inner documents were issued to check and desist the flow of peasants from rural areas to cities. Afterwards the system of detention and repatriation has always been in existence.

Great changes have taken place since the country began to reform and opening up. There has been dramatic increase of floating or migrant population, while the proportion of vagrants and beggars due to poverty came down, there appeared groups of people who wandered to escape from birth control, marriage, school and debts, as well as those who tried to make a living by begging.

With regard to the new situation, the State Council issued the Measures for the Internment and Deportation of Urban Vagrants and Beggars in 1982, which define beggars and other homeless people without proper source of income as targets to be detained and repatriated. Starting with the Measures, aid was no longer the exclusive goal of detention. Article 1 of the Measures makes it clear that the Measures had been formulated to “aid, educate and settle urban vagrants and beggars, for the purpose of maintaining the social order, stability and unity in cities.”

That is to say, the emphasis of detention was actually to “maintain the social order, stability and unity in cities.”

Later, the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the Ministry of Public Security issued the rules of implementation, stipulating that the expenses of detention and repatriation “should be incorporated into the budget for public affairs undertakings,” and that the revenue made from the productive labor of detainees as organized by centers of collection and repatriation should be used to subsidize their meals and cover the transportation expenses when repatriating them home.

In 1991, the No. 48 Document of the State Council enlarged the scope of eligible detainees to all people without legal identification paper, regular residence and stable source of income. But in practice, deviation from the regulation has often occurred. Identification card, temporary residency certificate and working permit all became indispensable. In some extreme cases even when the person under interrogation produced his or her temporary residency certificate, the legal document was torn on the spot so that the victim could be detained. After such wrong doings were denunciated, at some places, the police would first confiscate the certificates and declare they had expired, then another group of police would come to check and detain the victims.

In recent years, motivated by profits behind such detention and repatriation, there emerged other illegal activities, such as assigning quota of detention, obligating detainees to do hard labor, collecting fees under various excuses, and even trading detainees between different detention centers. Detention became a tool of making profits for many people, with a lot of citizens’ political, economic and personal rights seriously infringed upon. The holding system had long been under attack. As the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference was in session last March, Huang Jingjun, Chairman of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the China Democratic League, submitted a proposal entitled “Detention and Repatriation” Calls for Legislation So As to Operate by Law. He held that the original intention of detention and repatriation was to “aid, educate and settle urban vagrants and beggars, for the purpose of maintaining the social order, stability and unity in cities.” But now they had become a means to deal with migrant farmers, and were no longer what they had originally been up to. In a recent interview with reporters, Huang Jingjun, also a guest professor at the Law School of Beijing University, said, “After twenty years of enforcement, the nature of the Measures for the Internment and Deportation of Urban Vagrants and Beggars has changed. Detention and repatriation as understood by the law-enforcing organs have run counter to what they originally aimed at.” He pointed to two root causes of fatal incidents like the Sun Zhigang case, namely, the loopholes in holding system itself and the problems in enforcement. With very weak legislative footing, the Measures are no longer fit for the present reality. The new Regulations on the Management of Collection and Repatriation put into effect in Guangdong in April 2002 make it clear at the very beginning that “detention and repatriation are an act of social relief executed by the government.” But in practice, some law-enforcement organs intentionally or unintentionally expanded their power.

How to reform

As the Sun Zhigang case was exposed, the demand from various social circles to revise and even to abolish the Measures for the Internment and Deportation of Urban Vagrants and Beggars got ever louder and stronger. On May 14, a proposal on reviewing the Measures for the Internment and Deportation of Urban Vagrants and Beggars was faxed to the Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing committee of the National People’s Congress. It was signed as “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China: Yu Jiang from the Law School of Central China University of Science and Technology; Teng Biao from the Law School of China University of Politics and Law, and Xu Zhiyong from the Law School of Beijing Post and Telecommunication University.” They have a same identity as they all have doctorates in law.

The proposal is extraordinary in that it was put up to the country’s top legislature by citizens according to the Law of Legislation, urging to check if a certain decree ran counter to the Constitution. In the proposal they wrote: “To the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, As citizens of the People’s Republic of China, we believe that the Measures for the Internment and Deportation of Urban Vagrants and Beggars which was enacted by the State Council on May 12, 1982 and has been since in force to this day goes against the Constitution and relevant laws. We hereby propose to you that the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress re-examine the Measures for the Internment and Deportation of Urban Vagrants and Beggars.”

It can be said that short and simple as it is, this proposal from ordinary citizens formally set out the procedure of demanding the NPC Standing Committee to perform its power of checking an unconstitutional act from bottom up. It thus set a rare precedent. The proposal immediately drew concerns from experts and scholars in Beijing.
　　　　　
Suspects in Sun Zhigang case are under trial.

At a seminar on the Sun Zhigang case and the system of detention and repatriation held by a group of experts and scholars in Beijing on May 21, Prof. Jiang Ping, a famous law expert, expressed his admiration and support for the proposal, saying that by putting up the proposal, the three young men “are legitimately applying the means and weapon the law has endowed them, not for their own interest, but for the dignity of the country’s law.”

On May 23, five other famous scholars, He Weifang, Sheng Hong, Shen Kui, Xiao Han and He Haibo, also jointly signed a letter to the NPC Standing Committee in the name of Chinese citizens. Again they urged to start a special investigation procedure on Sun’s case and the system of detention and repatriation in practice. Prof. He Weifang from the Law School of Beijing University said, this proposal was based on the proposal previously put up by the three law PH. Ds, but went further with the request to start a special investigation procedure, in order to push the NPC Standing Committee to check if the holding system was unconstitutional, thus bringing the matter into substantial legal operation.

The experts and scholars in Beijing unanimously hold that the current holding system has been seriously abused, causing severe infringement on citizens’ legal rights.

Yet their views differ on whether the Measures for the Internment and Deportation of Urban Vagrants and Beggars should be totally abolished. At a seminar organized by the Boya Economic Forum of the Business School of Beijing University on June 14, some scholars advocated for abolishing the Measures as soon as possible as they run counter to the most basic ethics and effect to segregate people. But some other scholars thought that although local regulations and administrative rules that had derived from the Measures should be abolished, the decree itself should be revised instead of simply abolished.

Professor He Weifang stands for abolishing the current measures of detention and repatriation, holding that the decree authorized the public security organs to be the main body of implementation and incorporated some compulsory regulations on detainees, which went far beyond the scope of social relief. The problems in the Measures are not something to be solved by revision, but by abolishment.

It has been universal practice in various countries of the world to have regulations on vagrants and beggars. For a long time in history, the countries embracing the British and American law system treated tramps and beggars as criminals. Even today, some of those countries still have the “crime of wandering.” Although the United Kingdom and the United States have already cancelled such a crime, relative regulations still exist. Therefore, Zhou Hanhua, an associate research fellow with the Institute of Law Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, is worried that the simple abolishment of the Measures may usher in new social problems.

Meanwhile, he agrees there are serious problems with the Measures, which urgently needs revision. This administrative decree in its text looks like both measures for aid in emergency and mandates, and in practice it has been executed as compulsory measures.

On June 18, Premier Wen Jiabao presided over a State Council meeting to examine and adopt in principle the draft of a new decree, the Measures on Aid and Management for Urban Vagrants and Beggars. The meeting held that tremendous changes have taken place in China’s economic and social development and population flow over the past two decades and more, so the Measures for the Internment and Deportation of Urban Vagrants and Beggars issued by the State Council in May 1982 was no longer in conformity with the demand of the new situation.

On June 20, Premier Wen Jiabao signed to promulgate the Measures on Aid and Management for Urban Vagrants and Beggars. This 18-article new regulation stipulates the principles of providing aid to urban vagrants and beggars, the establishment and management of aid centers, the scope of aid, the behavior of the staff workers at the center and accountability of those who violate the regulation. When the new Measures came to force on August 1, 2003, the 1982 Measures for the Internment and Deportation of Urban Vagrants and Beggars would be automatically abolished.

With the enacting of the new regulation, it remains to be seen whether the law enforcement organs across China would strictly carry it out and whether the rights of millions of migrant people in cities could be honestly safeguarded. People only expect that tragedies like the Sun Zhigang event will never occur again!



p20-p26 Link One The significant shift of the focus of the government’s role from power to duty represents a transformation from a “police nation” that put more stress on maintaining the social order to a welfare nation, in which the government’s function is more displayed in offering convenience and help for people to enjoy their living, work and freedom. This is in compliance with the new government’s definition of administration and endeavor to be closer to the people. How should the new regulation be evaluated? Prof. Ma Huaide, Dean of the Law School of China University of Politics and Law, who was invited to offer suggestions in drafting the Measures on Aid and Management for Urban Vagrants and Beggars, observes that there are five major changes in this new regulation.
1. From compulsory detention to voluntary aid

Prof. Ma Huaide says, the original Measures for the Internment and Deportation of Urban Vagrants and Beggars mainly functioned to maintain social order. Yet in implementation the regulation was seriously deformed, endowed with many additional functions of administration and social order management. So it departed further and further from its original intention to provide relief and could no longer meet the demand of contemporary social development. Now the Measures on Aid and Management for Urban Vagrants and Beggars has cancelled the compulsory stipulations and made the aid a voluntary act, introducing a free and open management. Anyone who is eligible for aid can apply for it, and the aid center must provide timely help. This is a measure of pure relief.

Article 2 of the new regulation stipulates that “the aid is a temporary measure of social relief.” Prof. Ma explains: “It is impossible for the aid center to offer a lifetime support for the aided. This is a measure of relief for a short period. The ultimate aid will be carried by the local government of the hometown of the aided or their family.”

2. Police fade out

Prof. Ma notes that in the previous work of detention and repatriation, the public security authorities played a heavy role in administration, with a full involvement from the beginning to the end for mandatory actions. But the new regulation “largely restrains the function of the public security authorities to the point that they will almost fade out.”

He points out that in the new regulation, the public security authorities are referred to on only two occasions, in Article 4 and Article 5. These articles make it clear that the public security authorities are only obliged to notify the vagrants and beggars that they may apply for aid to the aid center and provide guidance and escort for the handicapped, the juvenile, the aged and other people with difficulties to move, says Ma. “They by no means could order, demand or instruct. So this regulation is free from being compulsory or mandatory. This shows the exit of the mandatory management function of the public security authorities from the management of aid. Their function is the same as those of the transportation, health and urban management departments, even as a common citizen.” 3. Limited group of people to be aided Prof. Ma points out that the old holding system failed to define the scope of people to be detained and allowed leeway for abuse of power. The new regulation clearly confines the scope of targets to be aided as urban vagrants and beggars without a proper means of living. Certainly, says Ma, the composition of vagrants and beggars is very complicated. Some people even make a living by begging, wandering around to beg at daytime, but spreeing at night. Therefore, not all tramps and beggars are eligible to live at aid stations for free boarding and lodging. This is only a temporary measure of aid to those who could not fend for themselves. The new regulation thus offers a more clear-cut and specified definition on eligibility of people to be aided. A strict distinction is drawn between farmers who come to cities hunting for jobs or visit friends and those who are eligible for aid. “Gone are the days when a temporary residency certificate could determine if a person should be detained,” he says.

4. Aid centers not to make money

Governments above county level should take active measures to provide timely help to vagrants and beggars, and should incorporate all the expenses incurred by such aid into the budget. This, says Prof. Ma, is a very important stipulation. All the expenditure of the aid center must be listed among the government budget and guaranteed. “This was not written in many previous administrative decrees. The stipulation means that aid centers will be officially funding but will not have to earn their living any more.”

A serious problem cropping up in the implementation of the Measures for the Internment and Deportation of Urban Vagrants and Beggars in the past was that many detention centers, due to funding shortage, gave way to systematic loopholes and corruption. Staff member tended to extort detainees, which became a way of making profits for detention centers and defamed the holding system. “The new regulation has made it clear that aid centers are public institutions fully subsidized by the state. All their expenditure will be appropriated by the state, and the state input will be increased, probably considerably.”

Meanwhile, the new regulation stipulates that the state encourages and supports social organizations and individuals to help vagrants and beggars. “This is a policy guidance in legislation, indicating that the state desires to socialize the aid work,” Ma says. “Not only the government, but also individuals and social organizations shall be involved to do this work.”

5. More supervision on aid centers

“In the old regulation, we see more demands obligating detainees to do this and that,” Ma says. “But in the new regulation, most of the obligations are put up to the aid centers.” For example, the aid centers are required to offer aid on five items, including food and lodging. It also emphasizes that lodging provided should be separated for the aided of different sexes, and female staff should be available to female aid recipients.

The new regulation further defines the duties of the aid centers and the rights of the aid recipients, with far more detailed stipulations on the former. Such changes display the essential difference between the old and the new regulations: it has turned from state compulsory measures for keeping the social order into measures purely for providing aid. This is a fundamental change in the government’s conception of administration, with a shift of focus from control and management to responsibility and service.

This regulation was discussed and passed in principle at the State Council on June 18, signed for issuance by the premier on June 20, and promulgated on June 22. Prof. Ma says he is amazed at such swiftness. According to Ma, the State Council did not set out to organize the drafting of the new regulation after the Sun Zhigang event. In fact, he says, the revision of the Measures for the Internment and Deportation of Urban Vagrants and Beggars was started as early as in 1997. The Sun Zhigang case and the consequent proposals from citizens and scholars accelerated the production of the new regulation.

Link Two

Talking about the Measures on Aid and Management for Urban Vagrants and Beggars, Shen Kui, associate professor with the Law School of Beijing University, one of the five experts of law who proposed to the NPC Standing Committee to start a special investigation procedure, has the following to say.

Progress and shortcomings

The systematic transform aims to turn the old institution into a new one, with the old function transformed as well. It is to carry out a major reform and build something new within the frame of old system. This is different from drawing a picture on a piece of blank paper. It must quickly make clear some basic principles and rule. Otherwise, a lot of existing institutions will have to be eliminated immediately as they are no longer legitimate, throwing their staff into the risks of readjustment of their positions and even unemployment, while the system of social relief that should be existent might be absent. From this point of view, the new regulation is conducive to the system transfer at least in the following aspects:

First, it justifies the purpose of the system. Article 1 of the new regulation makes it clear that the purpose of the system is to aid urban vagrants and beggars who could not fend for themselves, to guarantee their basic rights to subsistence and to improve the social aid system. Such wording in itself shows that the new regulation has cut off the tie between providing aid to vagrants and beggars and maintaining social order of the cities. Providing aid and guaranteeing basic rights to subsistence become the independent and exclusive purpose, which is a recognition that everyone in China is entitled to the minimum living insurance.

Second, it defines in principle the scope of people eligible to be aided. Urban vagrants and beggars who “cannot fend for themselves” are listed as targets to be aid. This abolishes the discriminative treatment to the people without a legal identification paper, a normal residence, and proper source of income under the old system as well as its restraint for people’s mobility, which goes in conformity with new regulation’s purpose of aid.

Third, it manifests the principle that the aid is accepted on the voluntary basis. The old system applied the compulsory means in detaining and repatriating people, which spoiled the purpose of aid and reflected an improper motive of restraining people’s mobility. Although the expression of “voluntary” does not find its way into the new regulation, its articles (5, 6, and 11) all imply the voluntary principle in aid.

Fourth, it makes it clear that it is the government’s due responsibility to provide certain social aid. This is also in compliance with the development trend of welfare and payment administration that prevail in many countries today.

Fifth, it establishes the framework of social aid system. The new regulation not only principally defines a set of basic rules for the government to provide social aid, but also stipulates in Clause 2 of Article 3 that the state encourages and supports social organizations and individual to aid vagrants and beggars.

However, progress and shortcomings coexist in the swift system transfer. The shortcomings are mainly as follows:

First, the new regulation carries on the old way of differentiating the treatments to urban and rural people. Although the system designer may defend the new regulation’s targeting at only urban vagrants and beggars from the stance that “needs should be prioritized by urgency” and “one legal document cannot solve every problem,” it is still undeniable that vagrants and beggars do not live in cities only. This indicates that in the hasty establishment of the new framework of the social aid system, there lacks an overall planning so that it cannot treat all vagrants and beggars fairly.

Second, it fails to seriously deal with the most critical financial issue. Although Article 3 of the new regulation stipulates that “governments above county level should take active measures to provide timely help to vagrants and beggars, and should incorporate all the expenses incurred by such aid into the budget and have it guaranteed,” this article is not adequate to solve the issue of financial assurance. To a great extent, the old system was deformed because local governments could not provide sufficient financial support, and detention and repatriation institutions had to fend for themselves. Now, the new regulation strictly forbids aid centers from charging any fees, and demands they offer basic living shelter to the aided. It is dubious if local governments with varying economic strength could afford the expenditure.

Third, there are many loopholes in the new regulation due to too many generalized principles. This is inevitable as it was issued in haste and only contains 18 articles. For example, the scope of people eligible to be aided is still rather vague. What does it mean by vagrants and beggars “unable to fend for themselves”? There is no definition about the expression of being “unable to fend for themselves” in the new regulation, nor does it make clear that the eligibility covers both “vagrants” and “beggars” or either of the two.

In addition, there is no clear definition for the authorities of government departments. Clause 2 of Article 4 of the new regulation stipulates that the departments of public security, health, transportation, railway and city administration should perform their respective functions as expected in the scope of their own responsibilities.” Yet the regulation hardly makes any definitions of the power allowed to each of these departments, except that Article 5 touches a little bit on that. Article 17 only stipulates that detailed rules of implementation will be worked out by the Ministry of Civil Affairs under the State Council, but obviously it’s unlikely that the Ministry of Civil Affairs would use its own rules to define the authorities of other departments.

To conclude, Shen Kui suggests that a special investigation committee should be set up for the reform on the system, regardless whether it will be organized by the NPC, the State Council, or jointly by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Ministry of Public Security, or other government departments. The committee should absorb experts and scholars to participate and should carry out detailed and ample investigation and studies on issues of social aid. It is a reasonable tactic to spend six months to one year on working out a well-conceived plan for the reform on the system.

Link Three

New challenges to the new Measures

As the Measures on Aid and Management for Urban Vagrants and Beggars came to force on August 1, all detention centers will be completely transformed. Some of the aid centers look like hotels after revamping. They will be the home to urban vagrants and beggars. At the same time, the new aid centers are challenged by a series of thorny problems, such as the sharp increase in the number of aid seekers and the reluctance of some aid recipients to return home. Hence an urgent demand for specific rules of operation to carry out the new regulation.

Aid centers humanized

The original detention center of Guangzhou has been completely transformed, highlighting its humanized facilities. All the iron bars on the windows in the rooms to shelter the aid recipients have been dismantled, with iron beds provided. Toilets have been revamped to pay respect to privacy, while restaurants and reading rooms are added to make the recipients’ life more convenient. All the staff workers were trained before the aid center went into operation, which enhanced their consciousness of providing service.

There are now 21 people who have stayed on from the former detention center to receive aid. Some of them can tell of their home addresses, so they will be escorted home by the staff. Others have mental or IQ problems and cannot tell their home addresses and will be transferred to welfare institutions of Guangzhou or the cities, districts and counties where they are from. A 13-year-old boy who came to the center himself says, he came to Guangzhou to visit his uncle but failed to find him, as he ran out of money, he came to this center with the guidance from a police at the railway station. He says the food at that center is better than what he had at home, with meat and eggs available for every meal. Naughty as he is, he receives kind treatment from everybody at that center. When asked if he would stay at that center for a long time, he replies sophisticatedly that no matter how satisfactory the life at the center is, it is not home to fend for people forever. So he expects that he would be sent back home soon. Then he would share his experience with his folks in the village and tell them to seek help from this center when they encounter troubles in Guangzhou.

Detailed rules urgently required

Records show that in June alone, the original detention center of Guangzhou admitted 346 people, over 100 more than that of May. Sometimes there were more than 40 people coming here for help at one weekend. A number of thorny problems have emerged, such as the rapid increase in the number of help seekers, reluctance of some of them to return home, insufficient funding for the center and chances for law offenders to make troubles.

1. Help seekers’ identity

First of all, the scope of people eligible for aid is yet to be clearly defined, so aid centers have to admit all the help seekers. However, most of the help seekers admitted in are not vagrants and beggars in strict sense, and it is very hard for the aid centers to check and confirm their identities in a short time. Yet the Measures on Aid and Management for Urban Vagrants and Beggars does not provide whether the aid centers could check and confirm their identities. Therefore, there are cases in which some help seekers, though able to afford themselves, hide their cash or mail it back home, then come to the aid, declaring they are penniless and ask for help, in order to get free train tickets to go back home. Some aid center workers are worried that this trend, if not checked, might become more serious during the Spring Festival period when migrant workers rush home for family reunions and railway transportation is more intensified. Meanwhile, some aid recipients are drug addicts or have mental health problems, and the aid centers are not allowed to reject them or send them to rehabilitation institutions for drug addicts or hospitals for mental health by force. Yet the aid centers cannot cope with them when they are caught in a fit.

2. Lack of outlays

The second problem is the lack of outlays. Once an injured man from Yunfu of Guangdong Province came to the aid center for help. The doctor at the center gave him a check up and sent him to the hospital nearby, where it confirmed that his ribs were broken. But his family refused to take him back, and the aid center could not afford his medical expenses.

3. Hard to discharge

Some invalid, disabled, aged and juvenile people, once admitted in to the aid centers, are hard to discharge as their families are unwilling to take them home. The present concept of repatriation asks aid centers to show respect for aid recipients on whether they should be escorted home. But sometimes when the aid center escorts them home from afar, neither the local civil affairs authorities nor their families are willing to take them.

4. Unwilling to go home

Many help seekers do not want to leave the fairly facilitated aid centers and would stay as long as possible. That makes it impossible for the aid centers to admit new help seekers. Also in absence is a regulation on the help seekers’ behavior at the aid centers, causing troubles in management.

5. Chances for law offenders

The exit of the detention and repatriation system might create a vacuum in the social order management. Some experts have proposed that another law on maintaining social order be drafted to restrain the personal freedom of lawbreakers through legal procedures.